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Linear-Quadratic Differential Games
Jairo Inga, Esther Bischoff, Timothy L. Molloy, Michael Flad, Sören Hohmann
Abstract—This paper addresses the inverse problem of differ-
ential games, where the aim is to compute cost functions which
lead to observed Nash equilibrium trajectories. The solution of
this problem allows the generation of a model for inferring the
intent of several agents interacting with each other. We present
a method to find all cost functions which lead to the same Nash
equilibrium in an infinite-horizon LQ differential game. The
approach relies on a reformulation of the coupled matrix Riccati
equations which arise out of necessary and sufficient conditions
for Nash equilibria. Furthermore, based on our findings, we
present an approach to compute a solution given a set of observed
state and control trajectories. Our results highlight properties of
feedback Nash equilibria in LQ differential games and provide
an efficient approach for the estimation of cost function matrices
in such a scenario.
Index Terms—Game Theory, Optimal Control, Cooperative
Control, Identification.
I. INTRODUCTION
NON-cooperative differential games, first presented byIsaacs [1], are a mathematical approach to model optimal
decision making of several agents interacting with each other.
This theory has received considerable attention from the
automatic control community. In particular, linear-quadratic
(LQ) differential games have been an object of broad research,
especially due to the possibility to calculate a linear control
law. This class of games has been employed in various
applications including driver assistance systems [2], collision
avoidance [3], control of mobile robots [4] and of energy grids
[5]. Literature has grown around the development of methods
to determine the outcome of a game given the objectives of
each player, especially the Nash equilibrium which represents
the result which potentially arises when all players minimize
their individual cost function. However, in the last years, some
effort has been spent to develop methods to solve inverse
problems in a game theoretical setting, e.g. for human behavior
identification during interaction with an automatic controller
[6] or identification of biological systems behavior [7]. The
inverse problem in differential games consists of determining
the objectives of each player, described by cost functions,
based on their observed behavior.
The problem of identifying cost functions has been thor-
oughly analyzed in the one-player-case, also known as inverse
optimal control [8], [9]. It has received considerable attention
due to its possible application in robotics and to describe
biological systems, e.g. human motor behavior [10], [11]
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and insect flying trajectories [12]. Most of the applications
of inverse optimal control with real data include the use of
direct methods which demand the solution of several optimal
control problems to iteratively find the cost function which best
explains observed data [11], [13]. Solving an inverse differen-
tial game with a similar approach leads to large computation
times as shown in [14]. Therefore, more efficient methods are
required for estimating cost functions in a game scenario.
Previous work in inverse games includes methods for iden-
tifying the objectives or utility functions of agents in static
games [15], [16]. Results for dynamic or differential games
include a zero-sum two-player dynamic game [17] and a
general non zero-sum N-player differential game [14] for an
open-loop information structure. Concerning the closed-loop
case, [18] and [6] presented results for a two-player inverse
LQ dynamic and differential game, respectively. An inverse
LQ dynamic game was also considered in [19], yet restricting
the players’ cost function matrices to only penalize their own
controls and to only have diagonal entries.
The ill-posedness of inverse differential games is also an
issue which is acknowledged in all mentioned previous work.
However, it is generally reduced to the fact that the solution of
a differential game (or optimal control problem) is unaffected
by a multiplication of the cost functions with any constant
c ∈ R+. In an inverse differential game, the ill-posedness
transcends this fact, meaning that there are potentially several
or an infinite number of different cost functions leading to
the same Nash equilibrium which differ not only in a scaling
factor, a fact which also holds for the one-player case [20].
In this paper, we present results for a general infinite-
horizon N-player LQ feedback differential game. Our ap-
proach provides a means to find solution sets describing
all possible cost functions which lead to the same Nash
equilibrium represented by feedback matrices. To achieve this,
we exploit the coupled algebraic Riccati equations which
arise from the necessary and sufficient conditions for a Nash
equilibrium. This allows us to give sufficient conditions for the
existence of a solution of the inverse problem. Furthermore,
for cases in which no exact feedback matrix is available or in
which the sufficient conditions are not fulfilled, we present an
approach based on a quadratic program such that cost function
parameters can be found which best explain observed state and
control trajectories.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In
Section II, we formulate the inverse problem of differential
games in an LQ setting. Afterwards, we present in Section
III a reformulation of the coupled matrix Riccati equations
which allows us to give solution sets for inverse LQ differential
games. We show simulation results to illustrate our method in
Section IV before drawing conclusions in Section V.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider a differential game with system dynamics




x(t0) = x0 (1b)
where (A,
[
B1 · · · BN
]
) is stabilizable. We denote the
system trajectories by x(t) ∈ Rn and the control trajectories
of all players i ∈ {1, . . . , N} =: P ⊂ N+ by ui(t) ∈ Rpi .
In the course of this paper, we consider players to be
selecting their controls with linear feedback laws of the form






as the closed loop system matrix. We further restrict the control




∣∣F is stable}. (4)
The non-emptiness of F follows from the stabilizability of
(A,
[
B1 · · · BN
]
) [21].
Within the differential game, each player i aims to minimize











with respect to (1), where Qi, Rij are symmetric for all i, j ∈
P and Rii > 0 for all i ∈ P. We write Ji as a function of the
N -tuple of feedback laws K = (K1, ...,KN ) and the initial
state x0 since together these generate the state and control
trajectories x(t) and ui(t) via (1) and (2). The restriction to
F ensures finite cost function values.
We consider a non-cooperative differential game and as-
sume that the players’ strategies result in a feedback Nash
equilibrium defined as follows:
Definition 2.1 (Definition 1 from [21]): An N -tuple K∗ =
(K∗1 , ...,K
∗
N ) ∈ F is called a feedback Nash equilibrium if
Ji(x0,K
∗,Qi,Rij) ≤ Ji(x0,K∗¬i(α),Qi,Rij), (6)
holds for all i ∈ P, all x0 ∈ Rn, and all α such thatK∗¬i(α) ∈
F , where K∗¬i(α) = (K∗1 , ...,K∗i−1,α,K∗i+1, ...,K∗N ) .
We further introduce the following definition before formal-
izing the inverse LQ differential game problem.
Definition 2.2: The canonical parameter set of the LQ
differential game is the set Θ which contains all possible cost
function parameters of (5), i.e. all possible matrices Qi and
Rij , ∀i ∈ P, which lead to the Nash equilibrium given by
K∗ = (K∗1 , ...,K
∗
N ).
Problem 1: Assume that system dynamics matrices A,
Bi,∀i ∈ P are known and that the cost function structure is
given by (5). Furthermore, assume that the Nash equilibrium
feedback matrices (K∗1 , ...,K
∗
N ) are known. Determine the
canonical parameter set Θ.
Note 1: By solving Problem 1 we can also solve the
related problem of finding Θ, if instead of (K∗1 , ...,K
∗
N ), a





We will show further details in Section III-F.
III. INVERSE LINEAR-QUADRATIC DIFFERENTIAL GAME
In this section we first present general solution sets for
inverse LQ differential games based on a reformulation of the
Riccati equations. Afterwards, we consider the case in which
only measurements of the state and control trajectories are
available, i.e. K∗ has to be estimated beforehand.
A. Coupled Algebraic Riccati Equations
We start by introducing the following theorem.
Theorem 1 (Theorem 4 of [21]): Let there exist an N -tuple












j Pj +Qi = 0 (7)






Then, K∗ = (K∗1 , ...,K
∗
N ) is a feedback Nash equilibrium
as in Definition 2.1 and Ji(x0,K∗,Qi,Rij) = x>0 Pix0.
Conversely, if K∗ is a feedback Nash equilibrium then the set
of algebraic Riccati equations (7) has a stabilizing solution.
Proof: See [21].
Theorem 1 represents a necessary and sufficient condition
for feedback Nash equilibria. Hence, if the feedback matrices
are given, the cost function parameters must fulfill (7). We
exploit this fact in order to develop a method to solve the
inverse LQ differential game. The approach is based on a
reformulation of (7) which is presented in the following.
B. Reformulation of the Algebraic Riccati Equations
Before we present the reformulations, we first define a
Kronecker sum [22] as
X ⊕ Y = (X ⊗ Iq) + (Ir ⊗ Y ) , (9)
for squared matrices X ∈ Rr×r and Y ∈ Rq×q , where
Iq denotes a q-dimensional identity matrix and ⊗ is the
Kronecker product. In order to develop our reformulation of
(7), we require the following result.
Lemma 1: Define F⊕ , F> ⊕ F> (cf. (3)). The inverse
F−1⊕ exists.
Proof: F−1⊕ exists if all eigenvalues λi ∈ σ(F⊕), i ∈
{1, ..., n2} are different from zero. By using Theorem 4.8 of
[23], we discern that λi = µj + µk, where µj , µk ∈ σ(F ),
for j, k ∈ {1, ..., n} such that i is associated to a particular
combination of j and k, i.e. j = d ine and k = i − n(j − 1).
Since we only consider feedback matricesKi,∀i ∈ P from the
set (4), F is a stable matrix and thus λi < 0,∀i ∈ {1, ..., n2}.
The lemma assertion follows.
Unless otherwise stated, the following calculations are with
respect to a particular player i ∈ P. With the results of Lemma
1 we define the matrices






i ⊗K>i ∈ Rn
2×p2i . (11)
We write K∗i as Ki in (11) and in the following Lemma for
brevity.
Lemma 2: Let the parameter θi ∈ RL×1 denote the
vectorized matrices of the cost function (5) as
θi =
[




where vec(X) represents a column vectorization of a matrix
X . Then, the matrices Qi,Rij corresponding to θi satisfy (7)
if θi fulfills
Miθi = 0 (13)
where Mi ∈ Rnpi×L is given by
Mi ,[Si SiK
⊗





i +Ki ⊗ Ip) SiK
⊗
i+1 · · · SiK
⊗
N ]. (14)
Proof: We rewrite (7) as




























The first equality follows from vectorizing (7), while for the






which holds for any matrices X , Y and Z with suitable
dimensions [22]. The third equality (15) follows with the
results of Lemma 1 and the definitions given in (11) and (9).





vec(Rii) = vec(Pi) (17)












and thus (13) follows immediately with (14) and (12).
C. Solution Sets for Inverse LQ Differential Games
The parameters θi for which (13) holds are valid solutions
of (7) for a given K∗i . Note that the feedback matrices
(K∗1 , . . . ,K
∗
N ) completely characterize the Nash equilibrium
trajectories x∗(t) and u∗i (t), i ∈ P. This follows from (1)
fulfilling all conditions for admitting a unique solution for any
N -tuple of continuous controls (2) [24]. Thus, the parameters
θi are associated to a Nash equilibrium represented by either
the feedback matrices or the state and control trajectories.
Remark 1: If different parameter sets exist which represent
the same Nash equilibrium, then by equation (8) we discern
that different matrices Pi, i ∈ P exist which correspond to the
parameters θi. Both θi (by the results of Lemma 2) and Pi
fulfill the N equations (7) and are found by means of the set
of feedback matrices K∗i , i ∈ P, thus representing the same
Nash equilibrium trajectories.
The matrix Riccati equations (7) have multiple solutions
which potentially represent different Nash equilibria [25].
However, note that we are only interested in all parameters θi
which represent a specific Nash equilibrium. We now present
the following theorem as our main result.
Theorem 2: Let a differential game be given by (1) and
(5). With assumed knowledge of the control laws K∗i , the






with convex boundaries such that Rii > 0, ∀i ∈ P.
Proof: By inspecting (13) from Lemma 2 we can rec-
ognize that all parameters which satisfy the matrix Riccati
equations lie within the kernel of Mi. Therefore, all possible
cost function parameters of player i which lead to the known
Nash equilibrium are given by span(v(1)i , ...,v
(di)
i ), where di
represents the dimension of the kernel of Mi with basis vec-
tors vi. Furthermore, Mi depends on K∗. The set including
the cost function parameters of all players corresponding to
the Nash equilibrium represented by K∗ or the trajectories
x∗(t) and u∗i (t), i ∈ P is thus given by (19).
Corollary 1: The trajectories constituting a Nash equilib-
rium under N cost functions Ji(θ∗i ), i ∈ P will constitute the
same Nash equilibrium for Ji(θi) with θi = κiθ∗i ,∀κi > 0.




Note that the results of Lemma 2 as well as Theorem 2 are
derived with respect to the parameter definition in (12) which
considers the most general case where there are no restrictions
on the cost function matrices. We now present properties of
inverse LQ differential games based on the possible structures
of the cost function matrices.
D. Sufficient Condition for Inverse Linear-Quadratic Differ-
ential Game Solutions
The kernel of Mi characterizes all non-trivial solutions of
(13). Its dimension will depend on the number of linearly
independent equations generated by the npi rows of Mi
compared to the number of unknown parameters L. Since
rank(Mi) ≤ min(L, npi), the number of players, states and
controls of each player as well as the assumed properties of
the cost function matrices are important for evaluating the
existence of inverse differential game solutions. A sufficient
condition for the existence of a solution is given by npi < L
since this implies rank(Mi) < L, leading to dim(ker(Mi)) >
0. In the following, we discuss two main cases of the structure
of the cost function matrices:
1) Symmetric Cost Function Matrices: If we assume sym-










i∈P pi(pi + 1)
)
= L for any choice of
n, pi, N ∈ N+>1, dim(ker(Mi)) > 0 holds. The sufficient
condition is fulfilled and an infinite number of parameters
exists that solve the inverse differential game problem.
2) Diagonal Cost Function Matrices: Only in the case of
diagonal matrices, where L = n +
∑
i∈P pi, combinations
of n, pi, N exist such that npi ≥ L. Here we note that, if
rank(Mi) = L−1, a unique algebraic solution for any player’s
parameters may be found by setting θi,(j) = 1, j ∈ {1, ..., L}
and proceeding analogously to Proposition 1 of [8]. This is
possible for N = 1 e.g. if n = 1 and p1 = 1. Note that
npi ≥ L is possible for diagonal matrices, which means that
the sufficient condition for the existence of solutions for the
inverse differential game may not be fulfilled.
We now introduce an approach to find a solution of the
inverse differential game problem regardless of the presented
properties.
E. Quadratic Programming Formulation for the Inverse
Linear-Quadratic Differential Game
We define, analogously to the inverse optimal control liter-
ature (e.g. [26], [27]), the residual
ri =Miθi, (20)
which represents the extent to which the necessary and suf-
ficient conditions for Nash equilibria are violated. This may
happen e.g. if K∗i is not exactly known or if the parameters
do not represent a Nash equilibrium for given K∗i . We aim to











where Hi = 2(M>i Mi).
Proposition 1: A feasible solution, i.e. a local minimizer of
the quadratic program (21) is guaranteed to exist. Furthermore,
if Mi has full rank, i.e. rank(Mi) = min(npi, L), then (21)
has a unique global solution.
Proof: It is clear that both the constraint set defined by
IL and Rii > 0 represent convex boundaries. The quadratic
objective function is at least convex since M>i Mi ≥ 0 always
holds. Hence, a solution of the quadratic program is guaranteed
to exist. If Mi has full rank, then Hi > 0 and the objective
function is strictly convex, which means that a unique global
minimizer of (21) exists.
Remark 2: The constraint ILθi > 0 in (21) is introduced
in order to avoid trivial solutions. Literature in inverse opti-
mal control and inverse games often introduce the constraint
θi,(j) = 1 for any j ∈ {1, ..., L} (see [14] and references
therein). The existence of the solution of (21) with this
constraint under the same conditions as in Proposition 1 can
easily be proved as well. Also note that, in case of diagonal
cost function matrices, ILθi > 0 ensures Rii > 0.
Remark 3: Symmetry of the cost function matrices is
considered by introducing corresponding parameter constraints
in (21), which we omitted in favor of better readability.
An alternative is to modify the matrix Mi according to a
redefinition of the parameter vector of player i as θi =[
vech(Qi)> vech(Ri1)> · · · vech(RiN )>
]>
, where vech(·)
denotes the half-vectorization operator. This vectorizes only
the lower triangular part of a matrix. A similar approach can
be employed for diagonal matrices.
F. Identification of the Control Law
The optimization problem (21) always yields a solution
which is associated with a given Nash equilibrium represented
by K∗. However, in practice it is often necessary to estimate
the control laws out of observed Nash equilibrium control
and state trajectories. Identification of K∗ is performed e.g.
in [10] and [12] for a one-player differential game. For the
general inverse differential game, we apply a least-squares
identification based on (2). For this, we introduce a finite
sequence of sampling times Ki , {tk ∈ [0, T ] : 1 ≤ k ≤
Ki ∧ 0 < t1 < ... < tKi ≤ T} for each player i ∈ P, where
[0, T ] is the time interval of x(t) and ui(t). Let the value of
the state and control trajectories at tk be denoted by x[k] and
u
[k]










In this section, we present two LQ differential game ex-
amples to illustrate the presented ideas and methods. We first
provide a two-player game example to illustrate Theorem 2.
Afterwards, we examine with a three-player game how the
proposed method finds a valid solution of the problem based
on noisy measurements of the Nash equilibrium trajectories.
A. 2-Player Scenario
We consider a scenario consisting of two players controlling

















The ground truth cost functions of the two players are Q1 =
diag(1, 2) and Q2 = diag(1, 0.7) as well as R11 = 1,
R12 = R21 = 0 and R22 = 1. Therefore, the parameter






. We solved the LQ
differential game by calculating the solution of the correspond-
ing Riccati differential equations and extracting the converged
value of Pi. We note that the resulting K∗ represents a
Nash equilibrium since the calculated Pi satisfies (7) for all
players and the closed loop stability of (23) was confirmed
(Theorem 1). In this case, the Nash equilibrium is given by
(K∗1 ,K
∗




























which result in the canonical parameter set
Θ = {νiQ̂i, τiR̂ii}i=1,2, νi ∈ R, τi ∈ R+, (26)




i,2 ) and R̂ii = v
(1)
i,3 . This means
that the cost function parameters are unique up to a constant
parameter. In particular, µ1 = 2.4494 and µ2 = 1.5779 lead
to the defined ground truth parameters.
B. 3-Player Scenario
We now assume a more realistic scenario where the feed-
back matrices are not given and have to be estimated be-
forehand from observed data. Let us define 3 players which
simultaneously control a dynamic system described by







−8 −6 1 0
1 0 2 1
0 −2 0 1
0 1 0 −1




















The ground truth parameters of the three players were set
to Q1 = diag(1, 0.4, 2, 1), Q2 = Q3 = diag(1, 1, 1, 1)
and R11 = diag(1, 1), R12 = diag(0.5, 0.5), R13 =
diag(0.2, 0.2) and R21 = R22 = R23 = diag(1, 1)
and R31 = diag(0.2, 0.5), R32 = diag(1, 1), R33 =
diag(1, 2). The properties of this differential game lead to
dim(ker(Mi)) = 2, i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. We determined the Nash
equilibrium in an analogous way as in the last example and
calculated the trajectories x∗(t) and u∗i (t). The Nash character
of the equilibrium was also confirmed similarly. We added
white Gaussian noise to all trajectories and obtained x̃l(t) =
x∗l (t)+ εl,∀l ∈ {1, ..., n} and ũi,m(t) = u∗i,m(t)+ εi,m,∀m ∈
{1, ..., p},∀i ∈ P. Gaussian noise was chosen in such a way
that all signals have a particular signal-to-noise ratio (SNR).
We used different SNR levels for trajectory generation.
In order to analyze the performance of the approach, we
define the error measure for state trajectories
ex = max {ex1 , . . . , exn}, (28)
exj =
∥∥∥∥ x̂j(t)‖x̃j(t)‖max − x̃j(t)‖x̃j(t)‖max
∥∥∥∥
max
,∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n} (29)
TABLE I
RESULTS USING TRAJECTORIES WITH DIFFERENT SNR LEVELS
SNR in dB ex eu ||M1θ̂1|| ||M2θ̂2|| ||M3θ̂3||
5 0.259 0.535 0.190 0.382 0.280
10 0.152 0.424 0.176 0.291 0.229
15 0.102 0.261 0.152 0.238 0.160
20 0.052 0.204 0.102 0.177 0.178
25 0.024 0.088 0.049 0.079 0.060
30 0.014 0.028 0.018 0.034 0.041
and for the control trajectories
eu = max {eu1 , ..., euN } (30)






,∀l ∈ {1, . . . , pi}.
(32)
We further consider ||Miθ̂i|| in order to get a measure of the
Nash character of the parameters with respect to the ground
truth feedback matrices.
We determined the cost function parameters by first estimat-
ing the feedback matrices using (22) and then solving (21).
The results are given in Table I. The higher the SNR level,
the better the parameters represent a Nash equilibrium and
the better the model trajectories approximate the given state
and control trajectories. However, even for a low SNR of 5
dB, the results are still reliable. An example of the trajectory
approximation is given in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 for an SNR of 5
dB. We note that when noisy measurements are considered,
the estimated feedback matrices K̂i deviate slightly from the
ground truth matricesK∗i . Therefore, the identified parameters
lie within the span of ker(M̂i), where M̂i is calculated by
means of (14) with the estimated feedback matrices K̂i. We









i ),∀i ∈ P. In spite of this
fact, the approach is able to find parameters which describe
the observed trajectories adequately.
V. CONCLUSION
We presented an approach and sufficient conditions for
calculating solution sets of inverse infinite-horizon LQ games
based on a reformulation of the coupled Riccati equations. The
set includes all possible cost function matrices corresponding
to a stabilizing Nash equilibrium. We also derived a quadratic
program such that a solution which fulfills the coupled Riccati
equations at least approximately can always be found. In this
way, cost function parameters are found which best explain
measured trajectories.
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